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This paper explores how learning performance change when conflicting knowledge, 
beliefs or ideas combine and engage inside the same organization. A large body of 
literature on organizational learning have emphasized the importance of diverse 
knowledge to maintain learning and organizational performance. Despite the vast 
research, previous studies have assumed that members inside an organization share a 
common objective function. This assumption caused researchers to overlook the impact 
of conflicting knowledge and undermine the cost of learning. Using computer 
simulation, two cliques with incompatible payoff function that have various 
interconnection rate were devised. The model demonstrates a contradictory role of inter-
clique ties as the bridge for transferring group specific knowledge that foster 
performance and as the route for contaminated knowledge that incur learning cost and 
interrupt superior learning performance
Key words : organizational learning, cost of learning, conflict of interest, 
interconnection between cliques
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INTRODUCTION
1984 was a year of elation for Steve Jobs and others at Apple. In 1977, Apple, a 
fledgling company that revolutionized the computer industry with the introduction of 
personal computers, launches the first personal computer known as the Apple II. It only 
takes a few years for Apple II to become the world’s most popular computer and for 
Apple to grow to a $300 million corporation, being the fastest-growing company in 
American business history (Sculley, 1987). By early 1984, Apple had sold over 1.5
million units of Apple II. The succeeding model, Macintosh, seemed to have a bright 
future as that of the Apple II. In the first hours of the release, $7.5 million worth of 
Macintosh was sold and $53 million orders were made from schools and universities. 
Dealers, analysts, programmers and the media thought that the new Mac was, again, a 
technological revolution, for the graphic capabilities of Macintosh were unequaled by
any other computers in the market. However, this seemingly successful glory turned out 
to be a mere hype. The company expected to sell the Mac as many as 60,000 to 85,000 
units a month, when actually, they were selling around 20,000 (Sculley, 1987). In 
retrospect, Macintosh turned out to be a total failure, causing trouble for the company.
Chairman and founder, Steve Jobs, and CEO John Sculley had different visions for 
Apple, therefore, had different approaches to solve the catastrophe. John Sculley 
favored open architecture computers (e.g. Apple II), which were sold to education, small 
business, and home markets that are less vulnerable to IBM. So, he believed that it was 
right to place Apple II, which accounted 70% of the total sales, a head of Macintosh. On 
the other hand, Steve Jobs wanted Apple to focus on developing a closed architecture 
computers (e.g. Macintosh), so that the company can sell products that are alternatives 
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to the computers made by IBM. Jobs wanted to lower the price of Mac, heavily 
advertise the product to promote it further, and divert resources from Apple II to Mac
(Coursey, 2012). These different beliefs shaped the relationship among the workers 
inside the company. Mac division and Apple II division operated like a separate 
companies and their staff members were acting like competitors (Sculley, 1987). Finally, 
in 1985, Jobs was removed from the head of Macintosh division and he eventually left 
the company.
The previous case is instructive because it raises a fundamental question of the 
consequences of what would happen when conflicting knowledge, beliefs or ideas 
combine and engage inside the same organization. A large body of literature on 
organizational learning have emphasized the importance of diverse knowledge to 
maintain learning and organizational performance. The existing literature has focused 
heavily on three major streams. The first stream focused on the feedback process and its 
quality in organizational learning (e.g. March, 1991; Miller, Zhao, and Calantone, 2006;
Fang, Kim, and Milliken, 2014). The other stream emphasized on organizational 
structure, suggesting that learning is deeply influenced by structural factors such as the 
level of connectivity and the existence of hubs (e.g. Fang, Lee, and Schilling, 2010; 
Schilling and Fang, 2014). Lastly, there were research focusing on the environmental 
condition, such as complexity, change of speed, and interdependency that individuals 
have to face with (e.g. March, 1991; Posen and Levinthal, 2012).
Despite the importance, elaboration and development of the literature remain 
incomplete. Organizations benefit from knowledge diversity, when their members 
interact to exchange and create knowledge. The process of interaction (e.g. comparing 
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ones performance to the performance of other members) allows individual members to 
learn from better performing other. However, previous research assumed that 
individuals inside the organization share a common objective function; what is right for 
her is right for me as well. This assumption caused researchers to overlook the impact of
conflicting knowledge and incompatible belief, therefore, undermining the cost of 
learning from others. In the case of Sculley and Jobs, although the members of Mac 
division and Apple II division can have diverse knowledge, since their belief of the 
reality is incompatible, employee from Mac division can suffer from lower performance 
by learning from an employee from Apple II division; learning has its costs. In reality, 
organizational routine is a result of political bargaining between groups with various 
interests and objectives; routine is not developed from a conflict free setting (Cyert and 
March, 1963; March, 1991). Thus, it is natural to ask how incompatible belief or
different knowledge of the reality affect the performance in organizational learning. 
Also, given these incompatible interests, what could be the optimal structure for
superior learning performance?
Focusing on these key questions, I constructed an instrumental model 
incorporating the concept of conflict. I demonstrate, using computational methodology, 
(1) that under certain level of conflict, the organizational learning performance and the 
level of inter connectedness between cliques have an inverted U-shaped relationship. 
Moreover, I show (2) that the optimal level of overlap between the cliques varies with 
the level of conflict, forming an inverted U-shaped relationship. Lastly, I found that (3) 
given certain amount of conflict, the optimal level of interconnectedness have an 
inverted U-shaped relationship with the initial knowledge distribution or the group 
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specificity. With these results, under conflicting knowledge settings, I found a 
contradictory role of inter-clique ties as the bridge for transferring group specific 
knowledge that foster performance and as the route for contaminated knowledge that
incur learning cost and interrupt superior learning performance. In addition, 
interpersonal structure with conflict plays a role of a wall that restrict the transmission 
of knowledge.
Overall, this article makes two contributions. First, this paper establishes a 
foundation for a quantum jump in organizational learning literature by introducing a 
baseline model dealing with conflict of interest among members in an organization. The
new model provides opportunity for other researchers to explore the moderating role of 
conflict. Second, never before have conflict of interest between groups in organizational 
learning literature been systematically investigated. By bringing the conflict back in, we 
understand how the degree of conflict affects optimal organizational structure.
The flow of this paper is as follows. In the following section, relevant literature
is reviewed. Then development of an organizational learning model that focuses on how 
learning is considered by the pattern of conflict between two cliques is introduced. I
operationalize the degree of overlap with a single parameter that systematically varies 
the number of ties between cliques. We also tune the degree of conflict to find the effect 
of conflict on optimal level of connectedness. Finally, initial knowledge distribution that 
sets the two clique apart is operationalized by another parameter. The results and their 




Organizational learning is perceived as a property that emerges when members 
inside the organization exchange and recombine their knowledge to create new 
knowledge. After March (1991) highlighted the importance of balancing between 
exploration and exploitation with a conceptual model for organizational learning, 
subsequent studies have elaborated this baseline model in various ways (e.g. Fang et al, 
2010; Schilling and Fang, 2014; Fang et al, 2014). The types of modification can be 
categorized into three sectors; elaboration in organizational structure (network structure), 
imperfect feedback process, and various environmental condition.
First, numerous studies have revealed how organizational structure, especially 
formal structure, influences learning process with the baseline model that members in 
organization interact indirectly through an organization code (Cohen, 1991; Cyert and 
March, 1963; Daft, 1983; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; March, 1991; Stinchcombe, 
1990). However, such indirect learning concept is too restrictive and unrealistic. The
adoption of interpersonal learning has provided a chance to explore the effect of 
structure on organizational learning with realistic view. With this departure from the 
classic model, researchers have revealed how various factors of interpersonal structure 
affect performance in organizational learning process. For example, Schilling and Fang 
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(2014) showed that hubs in interpersonal network can play as regulator for balancing 
exploration and exploitation. Also, Fang et al. (2010) illuminated that semi-isolated 
group outperform fully connected or completely separated groups.
Second, there were elaborations on the feedback process that relaxed perfect 
information transfer assumption. For instance, Lant (1994) showed that feedback can be 
vague and contaminated in complex environment (Levinthal, 1997; Rivkin, 2000); it 
can be postponed or absent (Sterman, 1989, 1994; Denrell, Fang, and Levinthal, 2004). 
Moreover, while some distortions are caused by unintentional cognitive bias, Schilling 
et al. (2014) argued that there could be motivation for actors to ‘sugar coat’ their 
performance. Interestingly, such positively biased feedback was shown to bring positive 
effects by making organization sustain proper level of exploration. In addition, Schilling 
and Fang (2014) demonstrated the role of hubs when hubs distort information 
deliberately or inadvertently.
Third, several studies have brought various environmental conditions into 
consideration in organizational learning. These changes were incorporated as 
moderating variable in the model. After March (1991) showed that optimal exploration 
level is positively related to the degree of turbulence, various studies have illustrated 
that specific optimal level of exploration varies with environmental change. For 
example, Posen and Levinthal (2012) found an inverted U shape relationship between 
exploration level and turbulence and Fang and her colleagues (2010) suggested that 
partly isolated structure performs better in complex environment. Especially, the 
adoption of NK-model in the literature enabled researchers to explore organizational 
learning with various level of environmental complexity (Kauffman and Weinberger, 
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1989; Rivkin, 2000).
Organizational learning has been explored and elaborated by numerous 
researchers. Despite these endeavors, the fundamental concept of organizational 
learning that organizational routine is built among individuals with different interest in 
an organization has been largely disregarded (Cyert and March, 1963; March, 1991). 
Regardless of the direction of modification from the March’s model, nouveau models
still implicitly assume that every members in an organization share an identical learning
function. This means that the conflict of interest in building routine by organizational 
learning is non-existent. This neglect on conflict of interest (or difference in belief) in
organizational learning is largely due to the absence of a baseline model to deal with it.
In this paper I develop an instrumental model to discover how degree of conflict affects 
organizational learning and its optimal structure. Before I construct the basic model of 
organizational learning with conflict to systematically discover the cost involved with
recombining conflicting knowledge, I will briefly review previous literature on conflict 
in an organization and link this to organizational learning.
Behavioral theory of the firm and conflicting beliefs
A central concept in the Behavioral Theory of the Firm is that routine is the 
core of an organization and such routine is developed and shared with members in 
organization by performance feedback process, known as organizational learning 
(Argote and Greve, 2007; Cyert and March, 1963; Levitt and March, 1988). Cyert and 
March argues that these goals or routines that are formed by performance feedback 
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process are outcomes of bargaining amongst various coalitions with different goals and 
perspectives; business firms are sets of political coalitions (March, 1962). Within this 
setting, some coalitions exert greater influence and make greater demand on policy, 
ultimately affecting the organizational goal. The objectives are then stabilized by 
various internal processes and adjusted overtime. This is the development of firm’s 
routine and such routine is the result of a long-run adaptive process of organizational 
learning of the objectives. 
Cyert and March (1963) depicted this process of routine formation as the quasi 
resolution of conflict. Quasi resolution of conflict can be described as the tendency of 
organizations to approach disparate goals through coalitions that represent ‘temporary’ 
compromises between distinct interests. These conflicts of interests can involve tradeoff 
between goal dimensions and adoption of mutually admissible alternatives (Gavetti, 
Greve, Levinthal, and Ocasio, 2012). Complete goal consistency, or unified objectives 
are almost impossible to achieve. The Behavioral Theory of the firm precisely posits 
this point. According to Cyert and March (1963):
“…there is no internal consensus. The procedures for ‘resolving’ such 
conflict do not reduce all goals to a common dimension or even make them 
internally consistent.” 
Thus, like the discussed case between the Mac division and Apple II division, 
business firms are gathering of numerous political coalition with diverse belief and 
knowledge (March, 1962). We can safely argue that routine does not emerge from
conflict free setting and that organizational members learn from routine although the 
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conflict of interest has not been completely resolved. However, despite the theoretical 
backup that members inside an organization face a conflicting constraint during learning, 
organizational learning literature lacks this realistic assumption. 
Group specificity, cliques, and initial knowledge distribution 
A clique is a subset of a network in which the members are more intensely tied 
to one another than they are to other members of the network. Depending on the nature
of the overlap of characteristics, the force that ties members into cliques emerges 
(Gibson and Vermeulen, 2003). In other words, when individuals share overlapping 
characteristics it is likely that they share similar perspective, leading to the creation of
subgroups. For example, coalitions of a firm can be interpreted as cliques because
members that share interest or goals are more closely tied among who share that goal 
than they are to those who do not. 
It is highly likely that formation of cliques may cause subgroup members to 
cohere and share knowledge more often within the subgroup than with others (Asch, 
1952; Gibson and Vermeulen, 2003). As a consequence of richer exchange of 
information and knowledge, members within the same clique create and share specific 
knowledge (Azzi, 1993; Stasser, 1999). As discussed earlier, the specific knowledge of a 
clique might not be totally aligned with the firm’s routine. In the previous case of Apple, 
Mac division and Apple II division can be interpreted as distinct cliques. Respective 
division share specific knowledge or belief (e.g. Mac division believes in closed-
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architecture and Apple II division believes in open-architecture) and members interact 
more freely and openly within the cliques. 
The goal of this paper is to relax the implicit assumption that the payoff function 
for individuals while learning is unified and that recombining diverse knowledge do not 
incur cost. I try to demonstrate the possibility that learning from better performing 
individual may actually hinder organizational learning performance. Depending on 
which subgroups they belong to, individuals face a problem of a more complex problem: 
the choice is no longer just learning from a better performer, because, if the learning 
target’s belief is different from the individual, his performance will be jeopardized. 
Interconnectedness and inter clique learning behavior 
Not every clique automatically engages in inter-clique learning behavior 
(Gibson and Vermeulen, 2003). Research on subgroups and organizational learning 
demonstrate that while some groups are able to break routines and generate new 
knowledge that enhance their performance by learning from other cliques, other groups
gets trapped in previously adopted behaviors (routines), unable to develop and change 
their conduct (Argyris, 1976; Argyris and Schon, 1978; Hedberg, 1981; Argote, 2012; 
Edmondson, 1999, 2002; Levinthal and March, 1981, 1993).
One of the factors that could enhance the organizational learning and generate 
new knowledge is the level of inter-connectedness between cliques. Granovetter (1973) 
introduced the concept of strength of weak ties and brought sensation to the world of 
social science. The seemingly paradoxical finding that generative alienation is crucial to 
social integration (Granovetter, 1973) is germane to organizational learning as well. 
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Weak inter-clique ties aid cliques to search for and find valuable knowledge in other 
cliques (Hansen, 1999). Fang et al (2010) simulated an organization divided into 
subgroups to see how inter-group connectivity influences balance between exploration 
and exploitation. They concluded that moderate level of cross-group linking is optimal 
for highest learning performance. It is evident that inter-connectedness between cliques 
is a crucial variable in organizational learning.
THE MODEL
To reveal how incompatible (conflicting) objective functions of respective 
subgroups inside an organization affect the optimal structure of organizational learning, 
I elaborated the March’s (1991) classic model in two ways, especially, focusing on the
degree of overlap between cliques. First, we incorporated the concept of interpersonal 
learning, so that individuals learn directly from connected actors rather than from 
organizational code indirectly. Based on this departure, we build an interpersonal 
network with two subgroups with varying degree of inter-connectedness. Second, I
designated two idiosyncratic payoff functions to two separate subgroups. Thus, our 
model is composed of three entities: organizational network structure, payoff function 
and two subgroups (cliques).
Organizational Structure and degree of overlap
To construct an interpersonal network with varying degree of inter-clique ties, I
extend the ER random graph model (Erdös, P. and Rényi, 1960), which chooses and 
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links two nodes randomly in each step. We tuned the ER model by using parameter α as
the degree of overlap that indicates proportion of inter-clique edges to intra-clique edges.
For example, when α equals to 0.3, the proportion of inter-clique edges to total number 
of edges equals to 30%. We expect that using ER process to build an interpersonal 
network structure enables us to provide a simple baseline model and opportunities to 
further elaborate it by modifying structural assumptions. Figure 1 visualizes an example 
of an interpersonal network structure with varying degree of α.
-------------------------------------
Insert Figure 1 about here
-------------------------------------
External Reality and Payoff Function with conflicting belief
As March (1991) designed in his classic model, I construct the external reality 
with m-dimensions. However, for each dimension value of 1 was assigned, whereas the 
classic model sets a value of 1 or -1 with the probability of 0.5. This modification of 
external reality gives us the ability to deal with levels of individual knowledge at initial 
stage by adjusting probability distribution of value assigned without destroying 
generality.
-------------------------------------
Insert Figure 2 about here
-------------------------------------
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To generate two different objective functions in respect of conflicting 
subgroups (  	and	  ), the model divided the m-dimensions of reality into two parts: 
the conflicting part and group specific part (see Figure 2). First, for the conflicting part, 
the payoff function for individuals depends on which group they belong to. For part A 
(B), individuals in    (  ) have the incentive to deviate from organizational optimum 
respect to the size of β. In Table 1, parameter β indicates the incentives to deviate, which 
is equivalent to the degree of conflict. For instance, when β equals to 0.5, in part A, 
individuals in    will get 0.5 point for each dimension with 1, whereas they will get 
1.5 point with -1. On the other hand, individuals in    will get 1.5 point for each 
dimension with 1, whereas they will get -1.5 point with -1. In other words, individuals 
in    will show superior performance with -1, but organization will show its optimal 
performance with 1. The members have different beliefs regardless of the reality, 
depending on which subgroups they belong to.
Second, for the group specific part, individuals share the identical payoff 
function indifferent to their group origin. Each individual will get 1 point with each 
dimension with 1 otherwise 0. To represent group specific knowledge, we assign initial 
value for this dimensions with different probability for each group, which will be 
presented in the following section.
-------------------------------------
Insert Table 1 about here
-------------------------------------
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Organizational members divided into two subgroups and group specificity
The simulated organization is comprised of n individuals holding m-beliefs,
each of which has a value of 1, 0, or -1, about the external reality. At initial stage, each 
actor has idiosyncratic set of beliefs that is given randomly. For the conflicting 
part, we assigned 1, 0, or -1 with probability 1/3 for each individuals. On the other hand, 
for the group specific part, we assigned 1 or 0 for each part of the m/2-dimensions with 
different probability distribution for different affiliation to the subgroups, because 
individuals in a subgroup share clique specific knowledge. To control the degree of 
group specificity, we adopt a control parameter  . As   increases, in the group specific 
part, individuals in different groups tend to have heterogeneous belief at the initial point. 
For instance, when   equals to 0.3, in part A’ from Figure 2, individuals in    will 
have 65 (50 + 30/2)% chance of having correct beliefs at the initial point, while those in 
   have 35 (50 - 30/2)% chance. Conversely, in part B’, individuals in    will have 
65% chance of having correct beliefs at initial stage, while those in   	will only have 
35%.
Learning process : Inter personal learning
The model adopts interpersonal learning, meaning that the members of the 
organization learn from those that are connected to them. In learning stage, I largely 
followed ‘Majority Belief’ concept introduced in the classic model (March, 1991) and 
‘Multiple Objective Optimization’ model in Genetic Algorithm that evaluates each actor 
with their objective function before learning from each other. In other words, 
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individuals evaluate others that are connected based on their performance, and they 
learn from majority belief of superior performers.
Furthermore, to verify whether their beliefs are aligned with the organization 
when they reach the equilibrium, we calculate not only average performance scored 
with their objective function but also average number of correct bits measured by 
external reality. By calculating performance using both criteria, we can find out whether 
the routine is aligned with the external reality.
RESULT
In all results reported below, I computed the average of 1000 simulated 
performances. Unless otherwise mentioned, the following parameter settings, 
summarized in Table 2, was used. The external reality consists of 200 dimensions (m =
200). Each clique consists of 100 individuals, totaling 200 members (n = 200) inside the 
organization and I fixed the learning rate at 0.3. The simulated results are iterated until 
the organizational learning performance (the average of individual performance) 
reaches equilibrium. 
-------------------------------------
Insert Table 2 about here
-------------------------------------
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Analysis 1: the moderating effect of conflict (	 	)
Organizational learning performance with varying level of inter-connectedness
Figure 3 presents the organizational performance for different levels of inter-
clique connection rate for two different levels of conflict: β = 0 (no conflict) and 0.5. By 
comparing these two different levels of conflict, we can see the moderating effect of 
conflict in organizational learning. Other parameters (number of individual, level of 
conflict, total number of edges, initial knowledge distribution) are set as Table 2 (n =
200, d = 300,  	= 0.2). For each time step, ties link members according to the level of α
according to the ER process. Then the individuals start the learning process for 
subsequent time periods. As mentioned earlier, organizational learning performance is 
measured as the average of all individuals’ performance. We continue the process of 
learning for 1,000 periods, until the equilibrium is obtained (i.e. no further change in 
any organizational performance). 
-------------------------------------
Insert Figure 3 about here
-------------------------------------
As seen in Figure 3, performance tends to reach a steady state, and the inter 
connectedness (parameter α) affects the overall performance of organizational learning. 
For both level of β, when α is zero the organization can be characterized as fully 
isolated and members only interact within the cliques they belong to. The absence of
(‘weak’) ties hampers the exchange of diverse ideas and beliefs (e.g. including clique 
specific knowledge) across cliques, trapping organization in a local peak. However, 
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higher interconnectedness does not equate to greater long-run performance. As the 
results show for both graphs, the long run performance tends to be higher when α = 0.1
than when α = 0.8. Performance appears to be highest when α = 0.4 for β = 0.5 and 
when α = 0.2 for β = 0 (i.e. performance is highest when the cliques are ‘moderately’ 
connected). The level of connectivity and organizational learning performance has an 
inverted U-shaped relationship. Our reasons for the results will be discussed 
subsequently.
The fact that the proportion of inter-clique ties (α) and organizational learning 
performance has an inverted U-shaped relationship is not very radical. Previous research 
has already proven and reasoned this phenomenon (e.g. Fang et al, 2010; Posen and 
Levinthal, 2012). To understand why the relationship between the level of inter-
connectedness and long term learning performance is curvilinear, it is crucial to 
understand why the two extreme cases (fully connected and fully isolated) produce 
inferior results. When the cliques are strongly divided (low level of α), specific
knowledge from one clique that is useful cannot deeply penetrate into the members that 
belong to the other clique. This is because, members cannot interact freely among 
themselves and learn knowledge that is contradictory to their own belief and objective 
function shared within the clique. On the other hand when the inter-connectedness 
between two cliques are too strong, members have open access to other members 
belonging to the other clique. Free inter-learning jeopardizes correct but unique belief, 
since members of respective cliques lack time to preserve and nurture knowledge from 
their own clique. When the two cliques are fully connected to each other, the cost of 
learning from diverse knowledge is maximized, because members are exposed to 
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knowledge that is detrimental to their payoff function, leading to a faster loss of clique 
specific knowledge. 
The interesting part of Figure 3 is that the graph reveals β as a moderator for α in 
organizational learning. The level of conflicting knowledge works as an additive 
combinations of latent mechanism, so that the turning point is shifted to the right hand 
side of the graph (Haans, Pieters, and He, 2016). When members inside the organization 
faces more complex setting, not knowing what to learn, the increased cost of learning 
leads individuals to have more diverse knowledge compared to less complex setting. 
The moderating effect of conflict is important, because, many researchers have 
neglected the role of conflicting knowledge in previous research. Also, this can be the 
starting point of focusing on where the ‘balance’ between exploration and exploitation is.
Analysis 2: the effect of size of conflict ( β )
Optimal degree of overlap with varying level of conflict
Our results in figure 4 show the optimal level of connectivity with varying 
degree of conflict. As seen in the graph, the optimum level of overlap has an inverted U-
shaped relationship with degree of conflict. As we have stated above, an organizational 
structure with moderate level of connectivity outperforms that with excessive level of 
overlap or completely separated structure. We argue that clique specific knowledge 
should be nurtured inside a clique and spread to other cliques at the same time. In this 
sense, to understand how the degree of conflict influences the optimal level of overlap 
in organizational learning, we should investigate how such conflict affects spreading 
and preserving knowledge in organizational learning process.
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-------------------------------------
Insert Figure 4 about here
-------------------------------------
First of all, conflict impedes the transfer of knowledge between cliques. Thus, 
as degree of conflict increases, more inter-clique ties are needed to permeate clique’s 
specific knowledge to other cliques. This force drives the optimum level of overlap to 
increase with increasing degree of conflict. However, as conflict increases, marginal 
effect of additional inter-clique ties will decrease. Second, with high degree of 
connectivity, learning between individuals in opposite cliques is much more 
complicated and easily be misled, since those individuals are not able to figure out 
which knowledge (belief) is proper for them in blind learning; members have larger and 
more complex pools to learn from. Moreover, such complexity is amplified when 
degree of conflict increases. In this sense, an excessive overlap between cliques drives 
members to lose the direction and this force clearly increases with higher degree of 
conflict. As a result, such interacting relationship between degree of conflict and degree 
of overlap brought such curvilinear relationship shown above.
-------------------------------------
Insert Figure 5 about here
-------------------------------------
To confirm the relationship between conflict and optimal level of interaction, I 
have examined the model with different level of initial knowledge distribution: when 
the value of   is low, moderate, and high. As seen in Figure 5 the patterned 
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relationship is almost identical, being inverted U-shaped. However, the interesting part 
of Figure 5 is how   act as a moderator that weakens the curvilinear relationship 
between conflict and optimal level of interaction. To understand why such flattening 
happens, we need to understand the latent mechanism that shape the moderation effect 
(Haans et al, 2016).
Analysis 3: the effect of initial knowledge distribution (   )
Optimal degree of overlap with varying initial group knowledge distribution
The next experiment tries to figure the relationship between clique specific 
knowledge and optimal level of inter-clique connectedness. For presentation purposes, 
Figure 6a shows the relationship between the initial knowledge distribution (clique 
specific knowledge) and performance at equilibrium for three levels of   – 0, 0.2, and 
0.4. As seen in the graph, when  =0 the relationship between initial knowledge 
distribution and organizational learning performance is negative. This means that when 
members of respective cliques have no routes to learn from each other, the bigger the 
clique specific knowledge gets the worse organizational performance. On the other hand, 
when the conflicting cliques are moderately overlapped, initial knowledge distribution 
and organizational performance has a positive relationship. This itself is not a very 
innovative finding, because, this only shows the importance of diversity in learning. 
-------------------------------------
Insert Figure 6a about here
-------------------------------------
21
The interesting finding can be noted from Figure 6b. Figure 6b indicates the 
optimal level of interconnectedness across different level of clique specific knowledge. 
While, Figure 6a only shows the traditional argument of how diversity can be beneficial 
to the organization, we can infer from Figure 6b that learning can incur cost. If clique 
specific knowledge reaches a certain point (around 0.45) it is better for the organization 
to have lower level of overlap between the two cliques. Even though, individuals are 
faced with larger pools of knowledge to learn from, if the contents itself are in conflict 
they incur cost so that individuals have to face with lower organizational performance. 
If the body of knowledge is too diverse and complex, learning comes with costs.
-------------------------------------
Insert Figure 6b about here
-------------------------------------
Lastly, I varied the value of β to illustrate the robustness of the relationship 
between α and γ. The baseline model set beta as 0.5, because it is the most extreme 
case where conflict is highest. By setting the value of beta to 0.1 and 0.3 we can 
confirm how the relationship is unchanged between the clique specific knowledge and 
optimal level of connectivity. 
-------------------------------------




In this study an instrumental model is built to examine the influence of conflict 
and inter-connectedness on organizational learning. The first focus of the analysis was
on the extent of connectivity between two cliques by varying a single parameter α. 
Controlling for the level of conflict, I find that modest amount of cross-clique linking 
(i.e., around α =0.4) are associated with higher equilibrium performance levels. 
Moderately connected cliques help preserve unique knowledge and enhance learning by 
members of the other clique. The study also finds, rather surprisingly, that the 
interacting relationship between the degree of conflict and the degree of 
interconnectedness is curvilinear. High degree of conflict hinders the transfer of 
knowledge between cliques. In order to exchange clique specific knowledge more easily, 
more inter-clique ties are needed. These two opposing forces drive the optimum level of 
overlap to increase with higher degree of conflict. However, the marginal effect of inter 
clique ties will degrade. On the other hand, when two cliques are highly connected, 
learning complexity becomes higher for members because the knowledge to be learned 
is obscured; members do not know whom to learn from. This complexity rises with 
increased conflict between cliques.  Lastly, we designed the model to have knowledge 
conflict between two subgroups and these subgroups have their specific group 
knowledge parameterized by γ. The experiment showed how the relationship between 
group specific knowledge and optimal level of overlap is inverted U shaped. With this 
results I concluded that under conflicting knowledge, even when individuals are 
exposed to diverse and correct knowledge, their performance can be lowered because 
the knowledge conflict act as a cost of learning.
23
Limitation and Future research
Since our study has focused on the effect of conflict on organizational learning, 
we deal some constructs as given, not because they are not important, but because they 
are outside of our focus: our goal is to introduce a baseline model for organizational 
learning with conflict and verify the impact of conflict on the optimal organizational 
structure. I believe that future studies may shed light on issues stated below by using 
and elaborating our model. Possible variations of the model for future research is 
discussed.
First of all, the model assumed that inter-clique ties play an identically role 
compared to that of intra-clique ties in organizational learning process. However, 
frequency of interaction will vary with strength of ties so that inter-clique ties might be 
dominated by intra-clique ties in interpersonal learning process (Granovetter, 1973). 
Also, the quality of transferred knowledge might vary depending on whether the ties are 
formed inside a clique or between cliques. 
Second, we can vary the configurational properties of the clique (e.g. group size 
and group number). The configurational properties greatly affect the ways members act 
(Csaszar, 2012; Chen, Crossland, and Huang, 2014). By modifying and elaborating the 
properties I expect a more sophisticated model that reflect the reality much better. For 
instance, two groups in our model have the same size and symmetric objective function. 
In terms of size and symmetry, future researchers will be able to explore organizational 
learning with dominating subgroup by adjusting the size and assigning asymmetric 
objective function. Also, we can enlarge the number of cliques that are present inside 
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the organization. By elaborating the configurational properties of subgroups future 
research can effectively combine the organizational power literature to organizational 
learning to better understand the reality.
Third, in the model, we fixed and assigned the same degree of specificity of 
knowledge in each cliques. By modifying this assumption, future research might reveal 
the relationship between knowledge specificity and organizational learning with varying 
degree of conflict. 
Lastly, we assumed that the relationship between the degree of conflict and the 
degree of overlap is independent. However, there are numerous reasons to believe that
the two concepts are closely interrelated. By acknowledging the limitation, there are 
areas to improve. To sum up, we believe that our basic model opened up new area of 
organizational learning by bringing the conflict back in and provided plenty of 
opportunities for researchers to further develop the literature.
Figure 1. Example of a network structure varying the degree of overlap: a model 
with N(n, d, α); where n=the number of nodes, d=the number of total edges, α
=proportion of inter-clique ties to m
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Figure 2. External Reality divided into two parts: Conflicting Part & Group 
Specific Part
Table 1. Payoff Structure for individuals in   (  ) in Conflicting Part & Group 
Specific Part
Table 2. Summary of Parameter Values for Presented Results
Parameter Remarks Range of values
n Total number of individuals 200
d Total number of edges in organization 300
m Number of dimensions in external reality and individual belief 200
  Learning rate 0.3
  Proportion of inter-clique ties Vary
  Degree of conflict between cliques Vary
  Clique specific knowledge (initial dispersion of clique belief) Vary
1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1
A
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
B A’ B’
Conflicting Part Group Specific Part
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Figure 3. Effect of inter-clique ties with given level of conflict (Beta = 0 and 0.5)
Figure 4. Effect of level of conflict on optimal level of interaction
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Figure 5. Effect of level of conflict on optimal level of interaction with different 
initial knowledge distribution
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Figure 6. Effect of initial knowledge distribution on optimal level of interactions
(a) Initial Knowledge Distribution and Performance at equilibrium
(b) Initial knowledge distribution & optimal inter-connectedness
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Figure 7. Effect of initial knowledge distribution on optimal level of interaction 
with different level of conflict
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본 논문은 하나의 조직 안에서 대립되거나 양립할 수 없는 믿음, 목표 혹은
생각들이 융합되고 조합될 때 조직학습의 성과가 어떻게 변하는지 연구하고
있다. 기존의 조직 학습 연구는 다양한 지식이 조직의 학습에 긍정적으로
미치는 영향에 집중을 해왔고 대다수의 연구들이 조직 구성원이 동일한 목
표를 추구한다는 가정을 하고 있다. 이러한 비현실적인 가정은 다양한 지식
이 서로 상충 될 때 초래 될 수 있는 학습비용을 간과한다. 컴퓨터 시뮬레
이션을 통해 대립하는 생각을 갖고 있는 두 개의 파벌을 만들고, 그들간의
연결 정도에 변화를 주는 모형을 만들었다. 이를 통해 두 파벌을 연결하는
고리가 각 파벌 고유 지식이 퍼져 조직 성과에 긍정적인 영향을 미치는 역
할과 조직 구성원으로 하여금 잘못된 지식을 학습하게끔 하는 학습 비용을
유발 하는 이중적인 역할을 발견했다.
주 요 어: 조직학습, 학습 비용, 대립, 파벌간 연결
학    번: 2015-20628
